Document-based question

John J. Muccio, U.S. ambassador to South Korea, secret report to the U.S. secretary of state, June 1949.

It is evident, for example, that the development of communistic guerrilla forces and bases in parts of South Korea, especially on Cheju Island and in the Chiri Mountains has been dealt a severe blow in consequence of the successful anti-guerrilla operations conducted by the Korean Army during the months of March, April and May. . . . From another point of view the reported withdrawal at the end of 1948 of Soviet forces from North Korea, taken in conjunction with the completion of the withdrawal of United States occupation forces by the end of June will leave two native Korean forces facing each other across the long line of the 38th parallel. . . . Nevertheless it is the considered view of this mission that neither South Korea nor North Korea, with what would appear to be fairly evenly balanced military forces, is likely in the foreseeable future to assume the risks associated with a deliberate all-out invasion. It will be clear, however, as indicated above, that the confrontation of hostile forces along the 38th parallel offers numerous opportunities for incidents, whether premeditated or unpremeditated, which might burgeon into all-out warfare.

Dwight D. Eisenhower, president of the United States, answer to a reporter's question about the importance of Indochina, where French forces were fighting the communist-led Viet Minh, White House press conference, April 1954.

You have, of course, both the specific and the general when you talk about such things. First of all, you have the specific value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs. Then you have the possibility that many human beings pass under a dictatorship that is inimical to the free world. Finally, you have broader considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling domino" principle. You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences. . . . Asia, after all, has already lost some 450 million of its peoples to the Communist dictatorship, and we simply can't afford greater losses. . . . So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world.

George Ball, U.S. under secretary of state, top secret memorandum prepared for President Lyndon Johnson, July 1965.

The South Vietnamese are losing the war to the Viet Cong. No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms no matter how many hundred thousand white foreign (US) troops we deploy. No one has demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war—which is at the same time a civil war between Asians—in jungle terrain in the midst of a population that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the SVN) and thus provides a great intelligence advantage to the other side. . . . So long as our forces are restricted to advising and assisting the South Vietnamese, the struggle will remain a civil war between Asian peoples. Once we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat it will become a war between the United States and a large part of the population of South Viet-Nam, organized and directed from North Viet-Nam and backed by the resources of both Moscow and Peiping.

Minutes of a U.S. National Security Council meeting on Angola, five months before Angola's independence from Portugal, with President Gerald Ford, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and CIA director William Colby, June 1975.

The President: What are the white areas within the borders of Angola? Mr. Colby: These are essentially tribal, not military areas. . . . They have different languages and are different socially. . . . Secretary Kissinger: Mr. President, until the coup, the Portuguese had no intention of leaving their territories in Africa and didn't organize them for independence. Secretary Schlesinger: Most of the educated classes are in Luanda and support the MPLA. . . . Secretary Kissinger: Soviet arms shipments have reversed the situation. . . . Portugal is tilting toward Neto, and the Soviets are putting important equipment, such as armed personnel carriers, into Neto's hands. . . . Mr. Colby: While it would be useful to give assistance, it would be matched by the Soviets and there could be increased fighting and there would be no happy ending.

Shah Mohammad Dost, foreign minister of the communist government of Afghanistan, speech to an emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly called after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, January 1980.

Following the victory of the great Saur revolution, drastic measures were undertaken by the Revolutionary Government, in the interest of its toiling people . . . Millions of Afghans and noble peasants have been freed from the inhuman burden of paying interest to the usurers and from the unjust mortgage system imposed on them by the big landowners. Similarly, equality of the rights of Afghan men and women have been ensured. . . . However, imperialism and international reaction were disturbed and somehow surprised to see the independent and proud Afghan people freely choose the path of their future. These circles spared no effort to create obstacles in the way of the April revolution of the Afghan people. . . . In the wake of such intensified aggression and armed attacks against Afghanistan, my country had no alternative but to exercise its inherent right of self-defence . . . and to request assistance, including military aid, from the Soviet Union.

White House Photographic Office, photograph officially captioned "President Reagan meeting with Afghan Freedom Fighters in the Oval Office to discuss Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan," Washington, D.C., February 1983.

Presidents of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela (the Contadora Group, formed to mediate the wars in Central America), Cancún Declaration on Peace in Central America, July 1983.

We considered the critical situation in Central America and agreed that we were all deeply concerned at the speed with which it was deteriorating, as evidenced by an escalation of violence, the progressive mounting of tensions, frontier incidents and the threat of a flare-up of hostilities that might spread. All this, combined with the arms race and outside interference, creates a tragic setting affecting the political stability of the region . . . The creation of conditions conducive to peace in the region depends mainly on the attitude and the genuine readiness for dialogue of the countries of Central America, which must shoulder the primary responsibility . . . It is also necessary that other States with interests in and ties to the region should use their political influence in helping to strengthen the channels of understanding and should unreservedly commit themselves to the diplomatic approach to peace. . . . The economic backwardness which lies at the root of instability in the region and is the immediate cause of many of its conflicts should be approached from this standpoint.